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Abstract 
Previous aid effectiveness studies have typically attempted to identify recipient-side 
conditions of aid effectiveness – such as “good policies”, political and economic 
stability, and “tropical effects” – using cross-country growth regressions. An obvious 
omission from this list of conditions is the extent by which donors are concerned with 
achieving geopolitical rather than developmental objectives, which may reduce aid 
effectiveness insofar as strategic donors have less incentive to hold the recipient 
government accountable for the developmentally effective use of aid receipts. Aid 
allocation regressions can (and are) used to demonstrate the importance of 
geopolitical considerations, but the author also shows that such regressions cannot be 
used to instrument for aid in a second stage growth regression, as is standard practice 
in this literature, because to do so would invoke the untested assumption that 
strategically motivated aid is just as effective as developmentally motivated aid. 
Instead the author tests the effect of lagged aid flows on growth, and subsequently 
demonstrates that: aggregate aid flows are estimated to have significant but 
moderately sized effects on growth; multilateral aid flows have roughly twice the 
effect of bilateral flows; but that the lower average effects of bilateral aid nevertheless 
obscure a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the bilateral aid coefficient which is 
again explained by the degree to which these flows are indeed strategically motivated. 
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Introduction 
Most of the 50 year old debate over overseas development assistance has been 
concerned with whether foreign aid promotes growth “on average”.  According to a 
systematic review by Hansen and Tarp (2000), the answer is more often than not a 
qualified “yes”. However, the most recent round of debate, which Hansen and Tarp 
term the “Third Generation” of aid effectiveness research, has also concerned itself 
with the conditions of aid effectiveness, or second order rather than first order 
effectiveness. In this vein, researchers typically run country growth regressions in 
which they test the coefficients on three variables: AID, X, and AID*X, where X is a 
determinant of growth, and the last term is an interaction variable such that X now 
doubles as a potential condition of aid effectiveness.  These regressions have 
suggested that there may be quite a diverse range of such conditions.  Crudely 
summarised, aid may be effective: in “good” macroeconomic policy environments 
(Burnside and Dollar 2000) and politically stable countries (Chauvet and Guillaumont 
2002; Headey, Rao et al. 2004), presumably because aid is more likely to be invested 
rather than consumed in such environments; outside the tropics, for reasons not 
precisely known (Dalgaard, Hansen et al. 2004); in volatile economies in which aid 
appears to buffer economic shocks (Chauvet and Guillaumont 2001; Collier and Dehn 
2001); and in postwar economies where it facilitates general economic reconstruction 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2002). 
These studies arguably have critical implications for any overall assessment of 
the general effectiveness of aid, as well as the important policy issue of where donors’ 
funds would best be spent. Collier and Dollar (2002), for example, assume that aid 
effectiveness is only, and entirely, conditional upon good policies, and that aid cannot 
improve policies, which implies that foreign aid could be made more effective if only 
donors would allocate their funds from bad to good policy countries.  Their arguments 
have indeed had an impact on the US, British and Dutch aid agencies in particular, 
and have at least sparked interest in many other agencies. The results of other authors 
are somewhat less coherent in practical policymaking terms, as well as disturbingly 
pessimistic: Dalgaard et al. (2004), strictly speaking, should conclude that since aid is 
only effective outside the tropics, it should therefore only be allocated to non-tropical 
developing countries (of which there are few indeed).  
As far as Hansen and Tarp’s claim is concerned, then, there is very little recent 
consensus on whether or not aid is effective “on average”, whatever that may mean in   3
the presence of so much heterogeneity in aid efficiency. It may well be that 
researchers are still left with a new variation of the well known micro-macro paradox 
(Mosley 1987): why does foreign aid appear to be surprisingly ineffective in macro 
studies when micro studies typically indicate that aid has high returns?    
There are at least three possible solutions to this paradox.   
The most obvious is that there are serious methodological problems with 
micro studies, especially their inability to gauge the external effects of particular 
projects, as well as the fungibility problem. 
A second solution, and one more relevant to the debate at hand, is that there 
may be serious methodological problems with macro studies.  The cross-country 
growth regression, if not quite as dead as the dodo, seems to be high on the 
endangered techniques list. Results from cross-country regressions of aid on growth 
have shown aid-growth regressions to be especially sensitive to different IV 
techniques, aid measures, data structuring, regression specification (including the 
timing of aid’s effect on growth), treatment of outliers, and sample variations 
(Roodman 2004). Any one of these factors, or several of them, could be seriously 
hindering the accuracy and power of these tests, although as we argue below, it is by 
no means clear that all these variations in technique should be regarded as equivalent: 
researchers ought to justify and employ the best measure of aid, the best regressor, 
specification, sample, and so forth.  
A third and final explanation of the micro-macro paradox is that not all of the 
conditions of aid effectiveness have as yet been identified. Headey et al. (2004) 
attempted to assess all the previously identified conditions, and also show 
theoretically that any variable which determines the returns to investment, and is 
therefore a variable which ought to be included in a growth regression, may 
discernibly influence aid effectiveness.  But all the conditions tested in this literature – 
those of Headey et al. included - thus far have one thing in common: they are 
primarily recipient-side conditions of aid effectiveness.  Their implications are not 
only grim for those donors interested in promoting economic growth, they are also 
quite harsh on recipients since they essentially suggest that aid ineffectiveness is the 
result of the recipient country environment: its macroeconomic policies, its political 
institutions, the structure of its production and its biogeographical environment.   
Donors are only at fault insofar as they allocate aid to countries where it is liable to be   4
ineffective – those with poor conditions - and in disproportionate amounts such that 
absorptive capacity limits are reached and diminishing returns set in.    
This article chiefly explores this third line of reasoning by reassessing aid 
effectiveness with the other side of the equation in place: the donor side.  Our a priori 
hypothesis is quite simple. We suggest that a major explanation of aid’s observed 
ineffectiveness over the period 1970 to 2001 is the large degree to which aid 
allocations are biased towards geopolitically important countries in which aid is used 
to achieve non-developmental outcomes, such as political allegiances. In such cases, a 
selfish donor is unlikely to demand much accountability from the recipient 
government with respect to the use of their aid flows for fear of weakening political 
allegiances. This hypothesis is not new. Development experts, policymakers and 
journalists have been keenly aware of the political element in aid allocation for a long 
time. As early as 1968, for example, Gunnar Myrdal (1968), concluded that “the 
present system of bilateral aid has a strong tendency toward what, from an economic 
point of view, can only be construed as a misallocation.” More recent research has 
also paid lip service to such issues (Harms and Lutz 2004), but in general the most 
damning evidence of the ineffectiveness of strategic aid is anecdotal (for example, see 
Russell’s (2000) journalistic account of aid to Zaire), as well as very indirect 
inferences from aid allocation studies, such as in Alesina and Dollar (2000), in which 
donor motivations are used to explain recipients’ aid receipts. 
In fact we take our cue from the Alesina and Dollar study (Section II), by 
testing the influences of an expanded set of geopolitical influences on aid allocation, 
which encompasses post-colonial, Cold War and Middle East factors. Importantly, 
these regressions establish that the “strategicness” of aid flows obviously varies 
considerably across recipients, suggesting that political factors could conceivably 
explain the considerable variation in aid effectiveness observed in so many other 
studies. 
However, testing such a hypothesis – indeed, testing the effective of aid in 
general - is fraught with difficulties, discussed in depth in section III. The standard 
approach in all aid-growth regressions since Burnside and Dollar (1997) is to employ 
the aforementioned Alesina and Dollar type instruments to derive an exogenous 
measure of aid. But these would-be instruments are fundamentally flawed in ways 
which are largely ignored by the literature to date. The most important problem is that 
if our a priori hypothesis is correct – that is, that strategic and non-strategic aid flows   5
do have differential effects on growth - then the instrumental variables (IV) estimate 
of aid is biased because the degree of “strategicness” varies across recipients. These 
instruments may therefore utterly confound an appropriate test of strategic versus non-
strategic aid as well as any test of “aid intended for development”, which is what most 
of aid effectiveness studies aim to achieve in principle. Nevertheless, almost every 
study to date has employed these instruments as the only alternative to OLS and 
thereby implicitly invoked the precarious assumption that strategic and non-strategic 
aid flows are equally effective
1, while one study (Rajan and Subramanian 2005) 
actually only uses strategic instruments, thereby quite literally deriving a “strategic 
aid-hat”. The only sensible alternative is to lag aid flows, which has other benefits, 
discussed below.  
In section IV we employ what we believe are the best techniques available to 
test the effectiveness of aid “on average” as well as the differential effectiveness of 
strategic and developmental aid. We find that improving the techniques with which 
aid is tested substantially leads to larger and more significant estimates of aid’s 
positive average effect on economic growth. However, there are some important 
conditional relationships. First, aid looks to have been especially effective in sub-
Saharan Africa (admittedly after controlling for low scores in other determinants of 
growth, such as governance, policies, geographical and political factors), but 
ineffective in Latin America and perhaps elsewhere. Second, in complete contrast to 
Ram (2003) – who did not allow for aid’s endogeneity at all – we find much larger 
effects for multilateral rather than bilateral aid, which is shown to be much more 
strategically motivated than multilateral aid. And third, when we derive admittedly 
crude indices of the “strategicness” of recipients in the eyes of Western donors, we 
find considerable evidence that such strategicness reduces the effect of aid flows, 
especially bilateral aid, as expected.  
Section V concludes. This study sought to lend weight to the haphazard 
evidence that the political dimensions of aid delivery are not independent of aid’s 
outcomes. Nor should we expect them to be: wherever the purpose of aid is to placate 
or bribe government elites in developing countries, it should hardly be surprising that 
donors’ efforts to make aid as developmentally productive as possible, including 
using aid to induce policy reform, are substantially reduced. Moreover, although our 
                                                 
1With the main exception being Clemens et al. (2004) who also use their short impact measure lagged 
one period, rather than fully instrumented.   6
results, like any cross-country growth regression, represent historical findings, there is 
little doubt that many types of strategic motivations still heavily influence aid 
allocations, and, by association, the effectiveness of such aid flows. Any attempts to 
reform the aid industry by depoliticizing aid allocations should be welcome, including 
increasing the influence of multilateral institutions. 
 
II. Donor motivations and aid allocation 
What types of strategic political motivations explain aid allocation? How 
sensitive are donors to strategic opportunities? The usual means of answering this sort 
of question is to run a cross-country regression with aid flows as the dependent 
variable, to be explained by donor motivation variables. This allows researchers to 
make ceteris paribus type inferences on the influe nces of strategic political variables, 
whilst controlling for needs-based or developmental factors. In Table 1 we carry out 
this exercise with a wide range of variables explaining aid to GDP ratios across some 
56 developing countries at both low and middle income levels (see Table 1A in our 
appendix). The choice of countries is determined by data availability, but we have 
also excluded countries which were already substantially developed during the period 
under consideration (such as Singapore and South Korea), as well as Eastern 
European countries and countries with small populations (less than a million in 1970). 
The data are grouped into four year averages over the period 1970 to 2001 (although 
we sometimes use lags relating to the period 1960 to 1969) to give an unbalanced 
panel offering around 400 observations. The use of four year averages is useful for 
several reasons. First, it smoothes out business cycle effects which may be manifest in 
the GDP series as well as aid flows (e.g. if donor aid flows are procyclical), and 
reduces measurement error. Second, lagged four-year averages of aid appear to 
provide a good fit for the short to medium term dynamic effects of aid on growth, as 
we show in subsequent sections. Shorter periods are unlikely to smooth out business 
cycle effects substantially, whilst discerning the effects of aid received some 9 to 16 
years in the past is probably asking far too much of the data given the high level of 
statistical noise (and omitted variable bias) present in cross-country growth 
regressions.  
Although the structure of our data conforms to that of most empirical studies 
in this literature, our dependent variable and some of our explanatory variables are 
relatively novel (see Table A1 in Appendix A for more detailed definitions). First, our   7
aid measure is not the standard overseas development assistance measure (ODA). The 
great weakness of this measure in terms of explaining aid’s short to medium run 
effects on growth is that it includes aid flows which are only likely to influence 
growth in the long term (such as education expenditure), or unlikely to influence 
growth at all (Clemens et al., 2004). A prime example of the latter, of course, is 
humanitarian aid such as emergency assistance and food aid. Therefore alternative 
measures are desirable. For 1970 to 2001, Clemens et al. derive an estimate of short 
impact aid from commitments data by multiplying the share of short impact 
commitments in total commitments (the only measurable short impact aid ratio over 
this period) by total disbursements, thereby assuming that the measurable short impact 
commitments ratio is roughly equal to the unmeasurable short impact disbursements 
ratio. They then compare this to some actual short impact disbursements data for 1990 
onwards. Elsewhere (Headey 2005a) we have argued against exclusively employing 
this measure for several reasons, the most important of which is the very poor 
coverage of the commitments data and the recent (1990-onwards) data by which it is 
benchmarked. The percentage of total commitments covered by the OECD’s CRS 
commitments for the earliest year in which it can be estimated is around 70%, while 
the benchmark disbursements data table has coverage ratios in some years as low as 
8% for the world’s largest donor, the US. Moreover, the ratio of CRS commitments 
data to DAC disbursements data was as low as 15% in 1990, and none of these 
coverage ratios are time invariant. There are probably other errors induced into the 
estimation procedure (for example, variables which systematically influence the ratio 
of commitments to present and future disbursements, such as wars, regime changes 
and natural disasters), but the incompleteness of the primary data source is enough to 
warrant a rejection of their final aid estimate. We therefore use a more reliable 
measure, actual aid disbursements less humanitarian aid, derived from the OECD 
DAC tables, which we term aid for production (PRODA). We use net PRODA but we 
are also able to separate PRODA inflows from outflows (loan repayments), a novel 
practice employed by Clemens et al which allows us to more clearly separate the 
effects of actual projects and program assistance without them being mixed with the 
additionally heterogenous effects of loan repayments. Nevertheless, ODA and 
PRODA are indeed highly correlated (ρ=0.95) and yield very similar results for the 
aid allocation regressions (results available on request).   8
We have also attempted to derive new variables which may explain aid 
allocations. The first is a measure of natural disasters, which is the number of people 
per million affected by a natural disaster. This proves to successfully explain aid 
allocations even after removing humanitarian aid form the left hand side. Another 
important new variable, given the context of this study, is a purely strategic variable. 
We created a dummy variable equal to one whenever a country received aid of more 
than 0.2% of GDP from several Warsaw Pact countries (the USSR, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia), data for which were again available from the OECD DAC statistics. 
These aid flows are excluded from the ODA and PRODA measures, which are 
essentially comprised of aid flows from the West during the Cold War (the Warsaw 
Pact aid dummies only apply to the early 1990s and before). We also employ a lag of 
this variable. Our rationale here is that foreign aid was one of the tools used by 
Western donors to compete with the Warsaw Pact countries for the political and 
ideological allegiance of Third World countries. The significance of the lag may also 
indicate that Western donors saw the reduction in Warsaw Pact aid as an opportunity 
to increase their political influence in such countries – to fill the void, as it were - and 
support economic and political liberalization. This appears to have happened in 
countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, among others. Finally, we also 
note that our Warsaw Pact dummy variable is quite highly correlated with arms 
imports, a variable which has been used in other aid allocation studies to positively 
explain aid flows, and which is significant in our regressions only when we remove 
the Warsaw Pact dummy. Thus our measure seems to capture the same sort of 
political motivation captured in previous studies. 
Our second, smaller innovation is to allow for much greater heterogeneity in 
post-colonial aid. Two of the most significant and robust indicators of aid flows in 
previous studies are GDP per capita and population size, which of course vary 
negatively with aid flows. Thus one would expect French and British aid flows (the 
main post-colonial donors) to their former colonies to vary with income levels and 
population sizes, just as all other aid flows vary according to these two factors.  
A final innovation is not to specify the Burnside and Dollar policy index and 
the POLITYIV democracy index in levels – which yielded insignificant coefficients 
on both variables – but in differences. We first found that both changes in policies and 
changes in democracy scores yielded significant coefficients with expected signs. 
However we subsequently decided to see whether there were asymmetries in the way   9
donors responded to decreases and increases in economic and political liberalization. 
The results are interesting, and suggestive of considerable asymmetry in the way in 
which donors punish and reward recipients for economic and political changes. As it 
turns out, donors (on average) only appear to reward policy improvements (and then 
too, only rather temporarily since they do not reward policy levels, a fact noted by 
Burnside and Dollar, 2000), but do not punish policy deteriorations (the policy 
deterioration dummy coefficient has the right sign and is reasonably large, but fails a 
t-test). This may be because donors frequently fail to punish recipients when 
conditionalities are not met, but also because some types of aid are intended to 
alleviate macroeconomic crises, which may be captured in the policy index. 
Conversely, donors do punish recipients for “de-democratizations”, but do not reward 
democratization (although this coefficient does indeed have the right sign, it easily 
fails a t-test). 
Turning to the results, how important are strategic political factors in 
determining aid allocations? To answer this let us first define variables as either 
developmental (non-strategic), semi-strategic and strategic. Developmental variables 
are either indicators of need (e.g. GDP per capita, life expectancy) or efficiency, 
reward or punishment (policy or democracy scores). Several other variables in this 
category were tested here, including governance scores and measures of political 
instability, but these were not robust. Semi-strategic variables include the log of 
population, since the higher aid levels which flows to smaller countries, some of 
which are less deserving of aid flows relative to populous poor countries like India 
(which may contain as much as a third of the world’s poor), are partly motivated by 
the ease with which political influence may be purchased in small countries (a vote in 
the United Nations General Assembly from tiny Togo is worth just as much as a one 
from massive India). Other semi-strategic variables include colonial factors. On the 
one hand, former colonies and expatriates from the donor country often still have 
close trade links which may be bolstered by aid-funded imports, while aid dependency 
also offers ex-colonial donors a means of extending their political influence into the 
post-colonial era. But on the other hand, post-colonial donors may have certain 
advantages (as well as perceived moral responsibilities) in making their aid flows 
more productive, including a common language and the possession of local 
knowledge and expertise (Cassen 1994). Finally, we argue that the Warsaw Pact   10
dummies, the Middle East dummy (covering Egypt, Jordan and Syria) and the arms 
imports interaction can safely be considered strategic political variables.  
Separating the variables thus, it is possible to gauge their relative significance 
by looking at the coefficients on the normalized explanatory variables. The 
coefficients therefore represent the change in aid receipts resulting from a change in 
the explanatory variable of one standard deviation, except with the dummy variables 
in which case they represent the effects of a dichotomous change. How influential are 
strategic variables relative to developmental variables? Compare, for example, the 
effect of a recipient’s income and life expectancy being one standard deviation lower 
than the mean (a substantial US$ 1,575 and 11.6 years), which results in an increase 
in aid  over GDP of 3.6 percentage points (1 percentage point due to GDP per capita 
and 2.6 percentage points due to lower life expectancy). This increase is considerably 
less than the extra aid a recipient would receive if it accepted Warsaw Pact aid during 
the Cold War (about 5.8 extra percentage points), while the effect of being a Middle 
Eastern country of strategic importance (Egypt, Jordan, Syria) is also substantial. In 
fact, these strategic effects are much larger than any rewards to policy improvements 
or punishments to anti-democratic regime shifts. The colonial effects depend on 
income or population levels, but when these are held to their means (equal to zero 
since GDP and LPOP have been normalized) the colonial effect is also substantial – 
some two and half percentage points of extra GDP. This is not to say that all donors 
give aid strategically – donor-specific aid allocation regressions unsurprisingly give 
highly varied results – and some donors, such as Scandinavian donors, appear to be 
almost solely motivated by developmental considerations (Alesina and Dollar 2000). 
However, it is also worth noting that even though these countries are generous in 
relative terms, the U.S., Japan, France, the U.K. and Germany account for around 
70% of total bilateral aid flows, and all employ aid strategically, albeit it to varying 
degrees. 
So given that donors, especially the largest donors, are frequently so sensitive 
to political motivations, should we be surprised to find that they are commensurately 
insensitive to the developmental impact of their strategic aid flows? At the very least, 
the substantial influence of political motivations in aid allocation suggests that such a 
hypothesis should be investigated in det. 
  
[insert Table 1]   11
 
Section III. Strategic motivations and biases in IV estimation 
By and large, strategic motivations have only warranted peripheral 
consideration in most recent aid effectiveness studies where the primary task has been 
to ask whether aid is effective on average, or whether recipient-side conditions 
explain the substantial heterogeneity in aid’s effect on growth. Insofar as they are 
considered, strategic motivations are only incorporated as a means of rendering aid 
flows exogenous with respect to growth, in that the aid allocation regression in 
Section II, for example, will serve as a first stage regression providing fitted aid 
values for a second stage growth regression. But if the political factors considered in 
such regressions are not independent of aid effectiveness, then this approach is highly 
inappropriate even if one is only interested in average aid effectiveness. In other 
words, by employing both developmental and strategic variables in a first stage aid 
regression, one is invoking the untested hypothesis that strategic aid is just as 
effective as developmental aid, even though common sense dictates that this unlikely 
to be the case. A recent paper by Rajan and Subramanian (2005) in fact to goes to one 
extreme by only employing strategic variables to explain donor-specific aid 
allocations to all recipients, after multilateral flows are re-assigned to each bilateral 
donor by reassigning its funding of multilateral institutions back to its bilateral aid 
flows). The fitted values from these regressions for each donor are then summed to 
give aggregate exogenous aid levels for each recipient. Unlike many other recent 
studies, they find almost no evidence that aid increases growth (they also employ 
some unusual techniques, typically using cross-sectional regressions on a sample 
which includes relatively small countries and very large aid recipients, decisions 
which are much more likely to bias down the coefficient on aid ). But of course, the 
hypothesis they are really testing is that strategic aid increases growth. The authors let 
us know that they are aware of this (in their appendix II), but argue that there are no 
valid reasons to believe that the effect of strategic aid differs from that of non-
strategic aid. As evidence of this they point out that aid has been given to “high-
growth dictators” as well as bad (although there is no evidence that aid caused that 
high growth, or that such countries have high levels of “residual growth” which is the 
effective regressor in well controlled growth regressions), that strategic aid goes to the 
“good” social sector as much as total aid (which hardly seems relevant at all – where 
is strategic aid supposed to turn up in national accounts?), and that their results show   12
that multilateral aid (relatively non-strategic aid) is just as ineffective as bilateral aid 
(relatively strategic aid). This last argument is the most perplexing, however, and 
illustrates the fundamental problem of using strategic instruments in 2SLS, since the 
authors cannot convincingly use strategic instruments – such as colonial dummies, 
common language dummies and strategic alliances – to explain multilateral aid flows. 
The test, therefore, is utterly confounded. 
But this problem is by no means confined to the Rajan and Subramanian 
study: all IV results in this literature suffer from the strategic bias problem, as well as 
several others. With standard IV approaches the “strategicness” of aid still varies 
across countries, so the results are still biased, and there is no way of knowing to what 
extent we are testing overall aid effectiveness or strategic aid effectiveness. In 
addition, the developmental instruments are probably not valid instruments at all in 
that life expectancy and indicators of political changes and policy reforms are unlikely 
to be robustly independent of growth.  Finally, using an IV approach can also induce 
the undiscussed problem of multicollinearity between aid and other explanatory 
variables. After all, a fitted aid value derived from the regressions in Table 1, for 
example, will effectively be an index of GDP per capita, life expectancy, and policy 
and institutional factors, all of which arguably belong in a growth regression. When 
the aid-hat variable is re-introduced into the growth regression, it is likely to be more 
highly correlated with the other regressands than was the original un-instrumented aid 
variable. Multicollinearity between “aid-hat” and these variables could therefore 
induce an additional bias in IV estimates. 
Let us now back up these criticisms with some empirical support. Table 2 
shows the correlations with three variables: non-instrumented aid flows, development 
aid (the fitted values of regressing aid against non-strategic variables only) and 
strategic aid (the fitted values of regressing aid against strategic variables only). The 
variables in column 1 are all variables which regularly appear in cross-country growth 
regressions. To show that multicolloniearity is exacerbated by using developmental 
instruments, compare the correlations between columns 2 and 3: fitting aid values to 
developmental variables substantially increases the correlations between most of the 
growth regressands and aid (especially those used in the first stage regression) and 
decreases the uncontrolled correlation with growth. An opposite effect generally takes 
place for strategic aid precisely because strategic aid tends to flow to countries which 
are typically not in the greatest need of aid. So multicollinearity could well confound   13
general aid tests, as well as any attempts to use IV approaches to separately test for 
differential effects between developmental and strategic aid. 
 
[insert Table 2] 
 
Now let us look at multilateral versus bilateral aid. Table 3 uses the 
instruments from table 1 to explain these two aid flows. We report both the 
normalized regression coefficients and the raw correlations. Notice that only one of 
the strategic variables significantly explains multilateral aid, the lag of Warsaw Pact 
aid, which may simply mean that multilateral donors were simply attempting to fill 
some of the financing void left over by the end of the Cold War. In any event, even 
the coefficient for this variable is much smaller than for bilateral aid, for which all the 
coefficients on the strategic variables are highly significant and large in magnitude. 
Looking at the semi-strategic variables we find that the colony dummy-GDP 
interaction is in fact now insignificant for bilateral aid: bilateral post-colonial aid 
allocations do not appear to significantly affected by per capita income 
considerations, only by population size. Instead, the reverse is true for multilateral aid, 
as one would expect. Turning to the developmental variables, most of the 
relationships are roughly the same, although bilateral aid appears to be slightly more 
sensitive to democracy decreases (although actually, there are relatively few such 
episodes), and about half as sensitive to natural disaster incidences, in which some 
multilateral agencies specialize. 
We extract two messages from this table. First, as expected, multilateral aid is 
much less strategic than bilateral aid, so these aid flows probably do serve as 
reasonably (perhaps the best available) proxies for non-strategic and strategic aid 
flows respectively. Second, it is not possible to derive a valid IV estimate of 
multilateral aid flows because they are not significantly explained by the only 
plausible instruments available. The only option in cross-country growth regressions, 
then, is to employ lagged flows, which we do in the next section. 
 
[insert table 3] 
 
Section IV. Average, Strategic and Non-Strategic Aid Effectiveness   14
In table 4 we show the effects of improving the methods used to test aid’s 
effect on growth, including the lagging of aid.
2 But before discussing the results, it is 
worth considering what sort of coefficient we should expect on the foreign aid 
variable. Rajan and Subramanian (2005) use a neoclassical production function with 
some plausible parameters and an important assumption that aid has no spillovers to 
predict that the aid coefficient should be somewhere in the order of 0.16: a 1 
percentage point increase in aid over GDP from its mean should raise growth by 0.16 
of a percentage point. Of course, one would hope that aid does have positive 
spillovers, but 0.16 is in any event a helpful benchmark. Those authors of course do 
not find much evidence that aid has an effect of anything like 0.16. Using what we 
have argued is a much better methodology, do we find any evidence that aid has these 
sort of returns? 
Regression 1 runs the sort of specification used in much of the literature, in 
that it uses an aid measure which does not exclude humanitarian aid, and does not lag 
aid. Switching to PRODA – that is, excluding humanitarian aid – without lagging 
immediately makes the coefficient on aid significant at the 10%, with a coefficient of 
0.05. In regressions 3 and 4 we lagged ODA and PRODA respectively, and the 
significance levels jump to 2.98 and 3.69 respectively, while the coefficients roughly 
double. In regression 5 we investigate the dynamic relationship some more by using 
contemporaneous aid (PRODA), and aid lagged one and two periods. This 
specification allows us to control somewhat for serial correlation in the aid variable. 
The results clearly suggest that the only significant relationship between aid and 
growth is a dynamic one: aid lagged one period is highly significant, while 
contemporaneous aid and aid lagged twice are most definitely not. Moreover, the 
coefficient on aid lagged by just one period is a relatively high 0.15, just under the 
0.16 benchmark. In regression 6 we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic GMM 
estimator with only one lag. The choice of just one lag may seem strange, but as 
Roodman (2004) discusses, previous results using GMM in this literature have tended 
to over-instrument for aid, which can lead GMM results to converge to OLS. The 
GMM estimate of the coefficient on aid is larger than OLS estimates (which seems to 
                                                 
2 The lagging of aid has several advantages. First, as Roodman (2004) and Clemens et al. (2004) 
discuss, if growth and aid events are evenly distributed during a four-year period, then the average lag 
between an aid disbursement and a subsequent growth event is only sixteen months, far too short a time 
for most investments to have much impact, especially since we are employing an aid measure which 
contains long impact as well as short impact aid. Lagging aid means that we are more likely to test the 
effects of aid over the medium term, which is probably all the data are capable of doing.    15
be a consistent result in this literature) at around 0.22, but the GMM results are 
sensitive in other ways: most of the coefficients on other variables in the model are 
insignificant, and I also find that using longer lags (2 and 3) renders the aid coefficient 
insignificant and reduces it to around 0.15. Given the sensitivity of GMM results, it is 
not our preferred estimator and we do not employ it again. 
Finally, regressions 7 and 8 test aid in the two continents with the most 
observations, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America. In previous research 
(Headey et al. 2004) we found that aid appears to have been ineffective in Latin 
America (and in non-SSA samples, the results of which are available upon request). In 
fact, this appears to very nearly constitute a stylized fact in this literature given that it 
was uncovered even in the very early work on aid effectiveness (Papanek 1973; Gulati 
1978). We reconfirm this result here, and also show that aid has been highly effective 
in low growth sub-Saharan Africa. We do not make any extensive attempt to explain 
this apparent “stylized fact” here,
3 but we do believe it is an interesting and easy way 
to show that the result that aid is effective on average certainly does not mean that it is 
effective everywhere.  
We now turn to the important question of whether the strategicness of donors’ 
motivations renders their aid less effective. Perhaps the most obvious and least 
controversial means of testing this hypothesis is to reconsider the multilateral-bilateral 
dichotomy. This question has previously been considered by Ram (2003) – and more 
recently by Rajan and Subramanian (2004). However, Ram uses the Burnside and 
Dollar aid data, which we have already argued is inappropriate, not least because it 
includes humanitarian assistance. But more importantly, Ram makes no allowances 
for the endogeneity of aid. It is little surprise, then, that he gets some unusual results: 
he implausibly finds that bilateral aid has very strong effects on growth – from 0.42 to 
0.77 when outliers are removed – while multilateral aid either has no significant 
effect, or a massive negative effect (-1.02). But because there is no allowance made 
for reverse causation, all this may really say is that multilateral aid goes to countries 
experiencing low growth episodes. The IMF, for example, frequently sends aid to 
countries undergoing macroeconomic crises, while many UN agencies likewise 
                                                 
3 One possible explanation is that aid outside Africa has been used quite strategically, often in 
relatively well off developing countries where its marginal returns are low. Though Africa is often said 
to lack absorptive capacity, especially in terms of local bureaucracy, the low capital stock ought to 
mean that aid has relatively high returns, according, at least, to the standard neoclassical production 
function. We cannot prove this postulate, but we do provide some evidence below which is at least 
consistent with it.   16
specialize in humanitarian disasters. The Rajan and Subramanian paper runs several 
regressions for different periods and finds no significant effects of either aid flow. 
However, as we alluded to earlier this paper employs an unusual methodology which 
involves an especially unconvincing instrumentation for multilateral aid. Their 
regressions therefore suffer from the same biases as Ram’s. 
Table 4 re-tests multilateral and bilateral aid non-humanitarian aid flows. In 
the first two regressions we employ the two incorrect methodologies, a non-dynamic 
OLS specification (Regression 1) and 2SLS with the instruments from Table 3, which 
are of course inappropriate insofar as multilateral is not explained by strategic factors. 
As might be expected, neither multilateral nor bilateral aid is significant, although the 
coefficient on multilateral aid is roughly double that of the bilateral aid coefficient. In 
regressions 3 and 4 we lag aid flows and inflows respectively. The coefficients are all 
approximately significant at the 5% level except for bilateral aid inflows which are 
highly insignificant. The coefficient on multilateral aid is estimated to be around 0.17 
for inflows or 0.19 for net aid, which accords almost exactly with Rajan and 
Subramanian’s neoclassical benchmark of 0.16. However, the best bilateral estimate 
suggests an effect of some 0.09, about half the effect of multilateral aid. We were also 
curious to see whether longer lags yielded similar results, and indeed they do: aid 
flows lagged two periods yield a slightly higher coefficient on multilateral aid (0.21) 
but an insignificant coefficient for bilateral aid inflows. As an additional robustness 
check we can remove one of the aid flows at a time, in case multicollinearity is 
confounding our test. This actually has the effect of increasing the coefficients on 
both terms: for multilateral flows the coefficient increases to about 0.25, for bilateral 
flows to 0.13. Finally, we note that there are no obvious outliers driving these results, 
although as usual there are countries which receive relatively large amounts of aid. 
However, quadratic specifications do not suggest that a non-linear specification is 
appropriate, and using the least absolute error regressor, for example, only strengthens 
our results (results available upon request). 
So this is some fairly strong evidence that aid may be less effective when it is 
strategically motivated. But what other evidence can we discern? One relatively novel 
approach is to use the coefficients from our first stage aid regressions to define indices 
which gauge the strategic attractiveness of a recipient to a donor. Thus for our index 
of strategic attractiveness, we use the coefficients on the Warsaw Pact aid dummy and 
its lag, the Middle East dummy, as well as the coefficients on population size, GDP   17
per capita and life expectancy, although we render the latter two coefficients positive. 
We justify incorporating the last three variables because significant amounts of aid to 
relatively wealthy countries (with high GDP per capita and high life expectancy) are 
likely to be strategically motivated, while smaller countries are also attractive to 
donors because of the greater ease by which political influence may be obtained, for 
example in UN voting. We also form a semi-strategic (or colonial-strategic) index 
along similar lines, which basically just adds a post-colonial effect to the first index. 
We do this for all aid flows as well as bilateral aid, the weights for which are obtained 
as before. The weighting of the four indices are given in Table 5, but these indices 
where then normalized before being used in the regressions in Table 6, which reports 
aid interactions with these indices for both total aid inflows and bilateral aid inflows.  
 
[insert Table 5] 
[insert Table 6] 
 
In Table 6 we again lag aid flows, as well as the motivation indices. For each 
index we run two regressions, one in which we only introduce the motivational index 
into an interaction term, and one in which we also add it separately. Whether one 
should include an interaction term separately or not is somewhat unclear. On the one 
hand, we could let the data decide, but on the other there are some theoretical grounds 
for leaving the motivational indices in the specification. Strategically important 
countries might possess unobserved characteristics, for example, which are not 
independent of growth (e.g. post-conflict recovery). Most of the results, however, are 
relatively insensitive to whether or not a motivation index is included separately. The 
main exception is the strategic aid interaction for all aid, which is negative but 
insignificant when the motivation index is excluded. However, the motivation index 
by itself is only marginally insignificant at the ten percent level. All the other 
interactions are always significant at the 10% level at least. Moreover, the sizes of the 
effects are considerable. Recalling that the motivation indices are normalized, we 
observe that aid effectiveness depends considerably on these political factors. Note 
that the effect on growth on aid is given by: 
 
(1)  δg/δa = βa + βam.M 
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where βa is the coefficient on the relevant aid flow (all aid or bilateral aid), βam is the 
coefficient on the aid*motivation index interaction, and M is the normalized level of 
the motivation index. Since the variable is normalized, the effect of aid on growth at 
the mean level of the motivation index is just given by βa. For total aid flows these 
values (0.11-0.13) are generally equivalent to those which we derived in Table 3, 
although for bilateral aid flows these coefficients (0.12-0.14) are considerably higher 
than they were in Table 4 (0.09). Moreover, these interactions explain substantial 
variation around these levels of “average aid effectiveness”. The bottom three rows of 
Table 6 give all the maximum, minimum and mean effects of aid. When foreign aid is 
allocated to non-strategic countries, its maximum effect is estimated to vary from 
0.15-0.25 for total aid flows, while bilateral aid’s maximum effect is estimated to be 
as high as 0.23- 0.30, well and truly on par with the high average levels of multilateral 
aid effectiveness (which are in fact somewhat sensitive to the specification of these 
interactions).  Conversely, aid can have no effect, or even small negative effects, 
when it is strategically motivated. 
Of course, there are probably several legitimate obstacles to accepting these results 
with perfect confidence. The method of using aid allocation coefficients is necessarily 
inexact since our ability to explain aid flows, and strategic aid flows in particular, is 
obviously somewhat crude. But any tool used to gauge these rather nuanced effects is 
not infallible. Furthermore, these results can be defended on several quite compelling 
grounds. Perhaps most importantly, the results in Table 6 are quite consistent with 
those of Table 4: multilateral aid, which we have shown to be considerably less 
strategic than bilateral aid, seems to have a larger average effect than bilateral aid, 
unless one controls for the political influences on bilateral aid effectiveness. When we 
do invoke these controls, we find that multilateral and bilateral aid flows do in fact 
have very similar mean effectiveness levels. Presenting two quite distinct forms of 
evidence in support of the same underlying hypothesis should make us reasonably 
confident that we have uncovered a real causal process, rather than a statistical 
artifact.  
 
Section V. Conclusions 
This paper has presented evidence which supports the hypothesis that donors’ 
political motivations - and not just recipient-side conditions such as good   19
macroeconomic policies - also have a significant and plausible impact on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid. We first showed that previous studies have generally not 
used appropriate econometric methods, the two key elements of which are an 
improved measure of foreign aid which roughly gauges “aid intended to promote 
growth”, and a dynamic growth specification which simultaneously renders aid 
exogenous (without relying on untested assumptions regarding the equal effectiveness 
of strategic and non-strategic aid) and identifies a plausible dynamic relationship 
between the timing of aid inflows and the eventual returns to those flows. We then 
considered one of the easiest and, in policy terms, the most important means by which 
one can decompose aggregate aid flows into strategic and non-strategic (or less 
strategic) influences, the multilateral-bilateral division. As expected, multilateral aid 
flows are not well explained by strategic aid variables, whereas bilateral flows are, 
such that the latter constitutes a reasonable proxy for aid flows that are relatively 
strategic in orientation. Testing multilateral and bilateral flows produced the predicted 
result that the multilateral aid produces growth effects roughly twice the size of 
bilateral flows. Moreover, the construction of motivational indices and their 
interaction with both aggregate and bilateral aid flows also suggests that a great deal 
of the variation in aid outcomes is explained by political strategic factors. In fact, 
these results show that bilateral aid can be quite effective when it is not politically 
motivated, while multilateral aid tends to be more effective on average.  
In this final section we address some possible objections to these findings. The 
most important of these is that the cross-country growth regression is a highly flawed 
means of testing the effects of a wide range of potential determinants of growth. 
Testing the effects of foreign aid on growth is arguably an especially hazardous 
exercise: aid is likely to be endogenous, it is difficult to measure accurately, and, most 
importantly of all, it presumably affects growth through several quite distinctive 
transmission mechanisms (Hudson and Mosley 2001; Gomanee, Girma et al. 2002): 
investment and consumption levels, macroeconomic outcomes and policies, and 
institutions, to name the most important. We are entirely in agreement with 
assessment. In our view, growth regressions cannot be used to make statements such 
as “aid has been a success”. Their strength, of course, is their ability to control for so 
many other determinants of growth so that researchers can make statements such as  
“controlling for initial incomes, policies, geography, and institutions, aid has had a 
positive effect on growth when it has not been used as a mere instrument of   20
geopolitics”. But this strength is also a weakness: another way to interpret these 
results is to conclude that “aid has increased growth net of its effects on other 
determinants of growth”, especially policies and institutions. It is very difficult to look 
around the world and find countries which have experienced aid-induced “miracles”, 
and likewise easy to find aid dependent “disasters”. 
But whether this is because aid does indeed worsen policies and/or institutions, 
however, is by no means clear. Whether or not aid improves or deteriorates 
governance, for example, has been shown to depend on which instruments one uses 
(Harms and Lutz 2004). Moreover, when we update Knack’s (2001) regressions of 
governance change against aid, we find that lagging aid reverses Knack’s result (see 
Appendix B). With regard to aid’s effects on policies, there is further ambiguity. 
While there is little doubt that conditionalities have often failed and, even when they 
have worked, have worked extremely sluggishly, the last twenty years also appears to 
have been a period of unprecedented reform. It therefore seems difficult to reconcile 
statements by Dollar and colleagues (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 
2002) that “Aid has not systematically affected . . . policies during the 1970-93 
period” with statements by Rodrik (2003) that “countries such as Mexico, Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru did more liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization in the course of a few years than East Asian countries have done in four 
decades”. It seems hard to believe that donors – the Washington institutions in 
particular - did not play any role in influencing these regimes. Moreover, several of 
the most stubborn African reformers – Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Kenya, 
Tanzania - were finally relenting to World Bank pressure at almost precisely at the 
time of Burnside and Dollar’s initial publications. 
Our view is that whether one regards aid as a success or a failure very much 
depends on what one expects aid to achieve. If institutions are primal, is it reasonable 
to expect aid to be an engine of growth? Probably not. If institutions are rigid and bad 
institutions are especially difficult to break down under the best of circumstances, is it 
reasonably to expect aid and aid donors to substantially improve them? At best, only 
very slowly. Aid operates in a Second (or Third or Fourth) Best universe. And while 
the effectiveness of aid flows can doubtlessly be improved along a number of 
dimensions, it is unrealistic to expect aid to easily produce the deep institutional 
changes necessary for growth.  Foreign aid is essentially a proximate determinant of 
growth, but the evidence here suggests that, measured against a more realistic   21
institutionalist yardstick, it is a reasonably effective one, especially when its 
motivations are, in a developmental sense, relatively pure. Moreover, donors can 
make aid substantially more effective simply by reducing the strategic biases of their 
aid allocations. 
 
  Appendix A 




GDP (LGDP)  Initial GDP per capita (the log of) 
TROPLAND  Proportion of land area in tropics 
OPEN  Sachs and Warner Openness index 
INFL  Log of the CPI+1 
GOV  ICRG Governance Index 
PINSTAB  Political instability (assassinations and revolutions) 
DTKPOP  Change in the number of war deaths 
LPOP  Log of population size 
POPG Population  growth 
SURP*  Budget surplus (%GDP) 
SCHOOLYR* School  years 
Aid Variables (all %GDP) 
ODA  Overseas development assistance 
PRODA  ODA less humanitarian aid 
PRODA_IN PRODA  inflows only 
REPAY  Repayment on ODA loans (aid outflows) 
_MULTILATERAL  
_BILATERAL  
Instruments for Aid 
DISPOP  Deaths per 1,000,000 people from natural disasters 
DDEMOC  Change in democracy score (0-10) 
DPOLICY  A change in the Burnside and Dollar (2000) good policy index 
DEMOC_DOWN  A dummy variable equal to 1 when there is any reduction in the 
democracy score 
POLICY_UP  A dummy variable defined as 1 when there is a standard 
deviation increase in the Burnside and Dollar policy index The 
standard deviation is used to overcome statistical volatility in the 
policy score which is due to its inflation and budget deficit 
components 
COLONY  Dummy variables equal to 1 for recent (20 century) former 
colonies 
EGYPT  Dummy variable equal to 1 for Egypt 
ARMS1  Lag of ratio of arms imports to total imports  
WPACTAID  A dummy variable equal to 1 if a country received aid flows of at 




*Excluded from base regression. 
Notes: For sources of the variables as well as fuller descriptions, see Headey (2005)   23
Table A2. List of Countries (N=56) 
Algeria Guatemala  Papua  New  Guinea 
Argentina Haiti  Paraguay 
Bangladesh Honduras  Peru 
Bolivia India  Philippines 
Brazil Indonesia  Senegal 
Burkina Faso  Jamaica  Sierra Leone 
Cameroon Jordan  Sri  Lanka 
Chile Kenya  Syrian  Arab  Republic 
Colombia Madagascar  Tanzania 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Malawi  Thailand 
Congo, Rep.  Malaysia  Togo 
Costa Rica  Mali  Tunisia 
Cote d'Ivoire  Mexico  Turkey 
Dominican Republic  Morocco  Uganda 
Ecuador Mozambique  Uruguay 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Nicaragua  Venezuela 
El Salvador  Niger  Zambia 
Ethiopia Nigeria  Zimbabwe 
Ghana Pakistan     
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Appendix B – Aid and Governance Changes 
In his 2001 paper, Knack found that aid levels appeared to cause lower 
changes in the composite ICRG governance scores over the period 1985-1995. 
Svensson (2000) engages in a very similar exercise and finds that aid raises graft in 
ethnically fractionalized countries. Tavares (2003) finds that aid reduces corruption. 
According to Lutz and Lux , however, whether this results holds or not depends upon 
the instrumentation strategy adopted. While Svensson uses income, the terms of trade 
and population size as instruments for aid, Tavares focuses on variables that capture 
geographic and cultural proximity. In this appendix we also show that lagging aid 
flows also reverse the result.  
Note that our dependent variable is updated so that we are measured changes 
in governance scores from 1985 to 2001. Our control variables are the initial 
governance score, the proportion of land within 100 km from the coast and GDP per 
capita in 1985. We also tried using other variables such as ethnic fractionalization, age 
dependency, illiteracy rates, population and population densities, measures of mineral 
resources, colonial dummy variables, continental dummies, and so forth, but none of 
these proved to be significant. Changes in these governance scores are fairly hard to 
explain, which also makes us somewhat suspicious that aid really has such a strong 
and systematic effect on governance in either direction. Table B1 reports our findings. 
In regression 1 we basically re-test Knack’s regressions using OLS and we do indeed 
find that aid dependent countries experienced small improvements in governance (an 
equally weighted index of government corruption, the rule of law and quality of the 
bureaucracy) over the period. Rather than instrument for aid flows however, we 
simply lag them. We do so for two reasons. First, IV estimates are clearly problematic 
in general, and given that it seems very difficult to effectively explain governance 
changes it is not easy to be sure that instruments used by Knack or Tavares are valid. 
Second, it seems such as plausible to define aid dependency as a very long term 
“disease”, so that aid flows in the 1960s, 1970s and all of the 1980s should also 
explain governance changes in the 1980s and 1990s. When we use two lagged 
measures of aid flows, we in fact nullify or reverse the Knack result. So as per 
Tavares, it even seems possible that aid flows may in fact have improved the their 
recipient’s governance. The Knack result therefore seems very sensitive to alternative 
specifications.  
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Table B1. Explaining changes in the ICRG governance index from 1985 to 2001. 
 
Regression 1 2 3 
Observations 49  49  49 
R-squared 0.63  0.61  0.62 
Period of aid 
measure 
1985-2001 1960-1989 1970-1989 
      
Variable 
 
   
Initial governance 
score   -1.02***  -1.03***  -1.07*** 
      
Proportion of land 
near coast  5.49*  6.07*  6.06* 
      
Initial GDP per capita  0.15*  0.28***  0.30*** 
      
Aid flows  -0.33*  0.39  0.56* 
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Tables and Figures 
 








1974-77  1.10 1.28 
 
1978-81 1.64 1.39 
 
1982-85 1.93 1.57 
 
1986-89  3.91 3.99 
 
1990-93 6.51 7.00 
 















1998-01  6.08 5.66 
   
Constant 5.09 3.94 
 
GDP per capita (GDP)  -0.95 -2.10 
 
Life expectancy  -2.58 -6.42 
 
BD Policy improvement dummy  -1.13 -3.15 
 
















Natural disaster incidence  -1.55 -2.43 
 
Log of Population (LPOP)  7.58 2.94 
 
Colony dummy  2.51 1.71 
 

















Colony dummy*GDP  -0.75 -1.74 
 
Warsaw Pact aid dummy  2.77 2.72 
 
















   
Observations 402
 











  All aid variables exclude humanitarian assistance and food aid. Standard errors are Newey-
West robust.  27











Growth in GDP per capita  -0.13  -0.25  -0.09 
GDP per capita  -0.45  -0.63  -0.32 
Tropical Land  0.20  0.36  -0.03 
Openness -0.02  -0.02  0.07 
Inflation 0.01  -0.04  0.02 
Governance -0.03  -0.12  0.01 
Political Stability  -0.06  -0.08  -0.04 
Change in war deaths  -0.14  -0.06  -0.11 
Log of Population  -0.25  -0.35  0.12 
Population growth  0.26  0.29  0.16 
Life expectancy  -0.49  -0.68  -0.27 
Non-instrumented aid  1.00  --  -- 
Developmental Aid  0.52  --  -- 
Strategic Aid  0.72  --  -- 
      
Notes: 
Development aid is the fitted values from including developmental variables only (the log of 
population (which is really semi-strategic), GDP per capita, life expectancy, the natural disasters index, 
the policy improvement dummy, and the democracy decrease dummy).Strategic aid flows are the fitted 
values from including semi-strategic and strategic variables only (three colony dummies, Warsaw Pact 
aid and its lag, and the Middle East dummy). 
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Table 3. Instrumentation attempts for multilateral and bilateral aid 
  Dependent Variable:  Bilateral Aid Inflows  Multilateral Aid Inflows 








1974-77 0.63   
 
0.53  
1978-81 0.68   
 
0.63  
1982-85 0.84   
 
0.66  
1986-89 2.29***   
 
1.70***  
1990-93 4.87***   
 
2.33***  
















1998-01 2.71***   
 
2.86***  
  Constant 3.57***   
 
1.57***  
GDP per capita (GDP)  -0.56*  -0.41 
 
-0.39** -0.48 
Life expectancy  -1.76***  -0.47 
 
-0.81*** -0.46 
BD Policy improvement  0.91*  0.13 
 
0.89*** 0.20 

















Natural disaster incidence  2.64  0.14 
 
4.85*** 0.28 
Log of Population (LPOP)  -0.69***  -0.28 
 
-0.44*** -0.20 
Colony dummy  2.06**  0.32 
 
0.46 0.29 


















Colony dummy*GDP  -0.24  -0.31 
 
-1.28*** -0.48 
Warsaw Pact aid  2.27***  0.26 
 
0.27 0.11 













Middle East dummy  4.77***  0.25 
 
-0.29 -0.03 
  Observations  395  395  
  R-squared  0.55  0.56  
  Adjusted  R-squared  0.53  0.53  
 
Notes: 
All aid variables exclude humanitarian assistance and food aid. Standard errors are Newey-West 
robust. 
 
 Table 4.  Is aid effective “on average”? 
Reg. No.  1  2  3 4 5 6  7 8 
No. Obs.  405  405  413 394 386 343  150  
R
2 0.40  0.40  0.26  0.43  0.31  0.18  0.43 0.42 
Ra
2  0.37 0.37 0.23 0.39 0.27 0.14 0.34 0.36 
Sample  All All All All All All  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Latin America 
Regressor  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS  GMM 
(1 lag) 
OLS OLS 




PRODA PRODA PRODA 
      




0.03  0.05    -0.04  0.22    
  
(1.40) (1.75)      (0.78) (2.14)     
AID_1 
   0.09  0.11  0.15  0.15  -0.06 
  
   (2.98)  (3.69)  (2.88)  (2.96)  (0.56) 
AID_2 
     - 0 . 7 2      
  
     ( 0 . 8 9 )      
REPAY_1 
    -0.61     -0.63  -0.07 
  
    (2.71)     (1.63)  (0.13) 
 
Notes: 
All aid variables exclude humanitarian assistance and food aid. Standard errors are Newey-West robust. Control variables are excluded for presentational simplicity only.   30 
Table 4. Testing multilateral vs. bilateral aid inflows, all countries. 
Reg. No.  1  2  3  4 5 6 7 
No. Obs.  394  341  348  343 301 348 348 
R
2 0.43  0.45  0.45  0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 
Ra
2 0.38  0.41  0.42  0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 






















    




(0.49) (2.06) (1.91) (1.98)    (3.16) 
Bilateral   0.04 0.03 0.04 0.09*  (0.04)  0.13   
  
    (1.91) 
 
(1.98) (3.17)   




(0.64)  (2.62)  (0.88)  (2.92)  (1.96) 
 
Notes: 
All aid variables exclude humanitarian assistance and food aid. Standard errors are Newey-West robust. Control variables are excluded for presentational simplicity only. 
 
 
 Table 5. Weights in the donor motivation indices 








GDP per capita (GDP)  +0.0005 +0.0005 +0.0003 +0.0003 
Life expectancy  +0.2255 +0.2255 +0.1540 +0.1540 
Log of Population (LPOP)  -0.1731 -0.1731 -0.0603 -0.0603 
Colony dummy  +14.477   +9.648   
Colony dummy *LPOP  -0.0009  -0.0001  
Colony dummy*GDP  +0.7543  +0.5531  
Warsaw Pact aid  +2.7654 +2.7654 +2.2728 +2.2728 
Warsaw  Pact  aid_1  +3.9071 +3.9071 +2.9549 +2.9549 
Middle East dummy  +3.5772 +3.5772 +4.7718 +4.7718 
 
Notes: 
Weights are derived from the specifications in Table 3, but with non-normalized dependent 
variables.Table 6. Tests of donor motivation indices. 
 
Motivation Index  Strategic  Strategic   Semi-Strategic   Semi-Strategic  
Aid type  All aid  Bilateral aid  All aid  Bilateral aid 
 
Observations  394 394 348 348 394 394 348 348 
 
Aid_1  0.11 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 




-0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 
  (1.40) (2.10) (1.72) (2.74) (1.73)  (2.02)  (2.23) (2.31) 
 
Motivation Index_1   0.48  -0.03  0.19  0.32 
   (1.58)  (0.16)  (0.75)  (1.09) 
Multilateral  Aid     0.16  0.16     0.13  0.11 
     (1.77)  (1.76)    (1.39)  (1.24) 
 
Repayments_1  -0.51 -0.46 -0.59 -0.61 -0.58 -0.49 -0.45 -0.43 
  (2.15) (1.91) (2.67) (2.74) (2.59) (2.14) (2.01) (1.94) 
            
R-squared 0.43  0.43  0.46  0.46 0.43 0.43 0.47 0.47 
Adjusted R-squared  0.40  0.40  0.43  0.43 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.43 
Minimum effect of aid   0.04  -0.03  -0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.08 -0.10 -0.17 
Maximum effect of aid  0.15  0.20 0.23 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.24 0.30 
Mean Effect of aid  0.11  0.11 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 
  
Notes: 
The motivational indices are normalized, so that the coefficients represent the change in aid effectiveness conditional upon a change of one standard deviation in the 
motivational index in question. Indices weightings are given in Table 5. All aid variables exclude humanitarian assistance and food aid. Standard errors are Newey-West 
robust. Control variables are excluded for presentational simplicity only.   33
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